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ABSTRACT: The tax system forms the backbone to the functioning of the South African fiscal 
authorities and it is has been recently questioned whether alterations in the existing tax mix 
could promote economic growth. Using quarterly data from 1990:Q1 and 2015:Q2, this study 
investigated the effects of direct and indirect taxes on economic growth for South Africa using 
the recently developed smooth transition regression (STR) model. Our findings suggest an 
optimal tax of 10.27 percent on the indirect tax–growth ratio, of which below this rate indirect 
taxes are positively related with economic growth whereas direct taxes are negatively related 
with growth. Above the optimal tax rate, taxation bears no significant relationship with 
economic growth. We therefore suggest that policymakers place a greater burden on indirect 
taxes and yet ensure that the contribution of indirect taxes to economic growth does not exceed 
the threshold of 10.27 percent.  
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1 Introduction 
 
In wake of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, most economies worldwide are in 
their recovery phases in the aftermath following the collapse of the US financial system. The 
global financial crisis took a major toll on key macroeconomic performance indices in countries 
across the globe with South Africa bearing no exception to this rule. In attempts to boost 
economic growth, policymakers worldwide are focusing on tax reform policy as a vehicle 
towards attaining this goal. For the specific case of South Africa, speculation has run high 
concerning local government plans to increase government expenditure by shifting the burden 
from direct taxes (i.e. personal income and corporate taxes) to indirect taxes (i.e. value added 
tax (VAT)). Apparently this tax reform policy comes recommended by the Davis Tax 
Committee and so far, these reforms have been advocated for based on two primary arguments. 
Firstly, it is contended that the current structure of the tax system in the country cannot foster 
higher economy growth due to heavy reliance on corporate and income taxes. In other words, 
if policymakers were to continue relying on direct taxes for purposes of increasing government 
revenue, then such tax increases would exert adverse effects on economic growth. Secondly, 
by increasing indirect taxes, less tax burden will be borne by individuals and corporations thus 
creating a conducive climate for domestic savings and foreign investments in the country. 
 
Given the relative importance which tax policy plays towards economic development, 
a number studies have taken the initiative of investigating the trade-off effects of taxes on 
economic growth for South Africa. To the best of our knowledge, there have been four case 
studies conducted thus far for South Africa and these are the works of de Wet et. al. (2005), 
Koch et. al. (2005), Schoeman and van Heerden (2009) and Saibu (2015). Collectively, these 
studies rely on a wide range of econometric methods applied to empirical data. For instance, 
de Wet et. al., (2005) estimate an augmented neo-classical growth model using OLS estimators; 
Koch et. al. (2005) use a two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to estimate an 
augmented neo-classical growth model; whereas Schoeman and van Heerden (2009) and Saibu 
(2015) make use of OLS in estimating Scully’s (1996, 2000) tax-optimizing model. Overall, 
the consensus drawn over these studies points to a negative tax-growth relationship for the 
South African economy. Whilst these studies provide a good basis for investigating the tax-
growth relationship in South Africa, we observe that the authors’ use of linear estimation in 
their empirical analysis leaves the studies prone to criticisms of not addressing possible 
nonlinear relations existing between the time series variables. This is a cause for genuine 
concern given the increasing amount of evidence in the literature in support of nonlinear 
dynamic structure of macroeconomic data. These nonlinear studies generally imply that the 
conventional linear models are misspecified. Moreover, the time span covered by previous 
South African studies encompasses a number of important political events and tax policy 
reforms, which furthers the case for possible nonlinear relationships between time series of 
economic variables. 
 
In our study, we contribute to the literature by modelling nonlinear trade-off effects of 
direct and indirect taxes on economic growth for South African using quarterly data collected 
between 1990:Q1 and 2015:Q2. Theoretically, we follow in pursuit of De Wet et. al. (2005) 
who augment Feder’s (1983) two-sector production function into a steady-state growth 
estimation equation. Empirically, we rely on the newly developed smooth transition regression 
(STR) framework in order to model out the nonlinear trade-off effects of direct and indirect 
taxes on economic growth. Given the wide range of available nonlinear econometric models in 
the literature, we consider the STR model as being most appropriate for the following reasons. 
Firstly, the STR model encompasses other competing nonlinear econometric models such as 
the threshold autoregressive (TAR), the Exponential Autoregressive (EAR) and the Markov-
Switching (MS) models, which are models that can be derived as extremities of the STR 
regression. Secondly, the STR model assumes a smooth transition between regime coefficients 
which is a feature of the econometric model which makes it theoretically appealing. Lastly, the 
STR model allows the econometrician to choose both the appropriate switching variable and 
the type of transition function unlike other regime-switching econometric models (Phiri, 2016). 
 
Against this backdrop, we structure the remainder of the article as follows. The 
literature review is presented in the next section of the paper. In the third section we outline the 
methodology used in the study whereas the data and empirical results are given in the fourth 
section. We conclude the study in the form of policy implications and possible avenues for 
future work. 
 
2 Literature Review 
 
For simplicity sake, the current available literature on the tax-growth nexus can be 
broadly segregated into two main strands of empirical works. First and foremost are those panel 
data studies which make use of log-linear estimates of augmented transformations of Solow’s 
(1965) neoclassical and Lucas’s (1988) endogenous growth models. Prominent examples of 
pioneers belonging to this cluster of studies include Kormendi and Meguire (1985), King and 
Rebelo (1990) and Barro (1990) who all set path for a wave of other empirical studies which 
also relied on cross-sectional data for empirical use. For a greater part of it, these earlier panel 
data studies reveal an inverse tax-growth relationship (e.g. Engen and Skinner (1992), Wright 
(1996), Lee and Gordon (2005), Folster and Henrekson (2001) and Romero-Avila and Strauch 
(2008)), even though some exceptional studies showed a positive relationship (e.g. Koester and 
Kormendi (1989), Devaranjan et. al. (1996) and Agell et. al. (2006)) and a couple of other 
papers have found no significant relationship between the variables (e.g. Levine and Renelt 
(1992), Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and Mendoza et. al. (1994)).  
 
A major criticism of the aforementioned studies lies in their inability to efficiently 
account for cross-country differences in their empirical analysis. A perceptible demonstration 
of this inefficiency is found for the US economy where the panel data studies of Koester and 
Kormendi (1989) and Devaranjan et. al. (1996) advocate for a positive correlation between tax 
and growth for panel data inclusive of US data whereas the single case studies of Mertens and 
Ravn (2013), Barro and Redlick (2011) and Romer and Romer (2010) all find a negative tax-
growth relationship for the same country. Another issue which can be raised concerns the 
failure of these studies to differentiate between distortionary and non-distortionary taxes. As is 
discussed in Karagianni et. al. (2013), differentiating between distortionary and non-
distortionary forms of taxation is important because the use of average tax rates is an 
inappropriate tax indicator due to it is strong correlation with public spending. To circumvent 
this issue, researchers have opted to use a ‘tax structure mix’ as a means of measuring the effect 
of tax policy on economic growth. This tax structure mix is combination of both direct and 
indirect taxes which is used in the estimation of growth equations. So far the consensus drawn 
from the literature is that corporate, income and other forms of direct taxes are more 
distortionary towards economic growth whereas indirect taxes, such as VAT, are either 
positively correlated or uncorrelated with growth (see Skinner (1987), Lee and Gordon (2005), 
Arnold (2008), Widmalm (2009), Dackehag and Hansson (2012) and Bujang et. al. (2013)).  
 
The second identifiable strand of empirical works in the literature vouch for a nonlinear 
relationship between taxes and economic growth and this group of studies can be further sub-
divided into two groups. The first sub-group of studies are those who followed in pursuit of a 
series of articles written by Scully (1995, 1996, 2000 and 2003) who developed both theoretical 
and empirical specification for computing the optimal tax rate which results in growth 
maximization. Belonging to this sub-group of studies are the works Chao and Grubel (1998), 
Hill (2008), Keho (2010), Schoeman and van Heerden (2009) and Saibu (2015). We note that 
Chao and Grubel (1998) estimate an optimal tax rate of 34 percent for Canadian data. On the 
other hand, Hill (2008) estimates optimal tax rates ranging from 9 percent to 29 percent of GDP 
across different states in the US. Meanwhile, Keho (2010) estimates an optimal tax rate of 22.3 
percent for Ivory Coast using data collected between 1960 and 2006 whereas Saibu (2015) 
estimates optimal tax rates for Nigerian as well as for South Africa for data collected between 
1964 and 2012. For the former country the optimal rate is found to be 30 percent whereas for 
the later the optimal rate is 15 percent. However, using data collected from 1960 to 2006, 
Schoeman and van Heerden (2009) find an optimal tax rate of 21.94 percent for South Africa. 
What is important to note is that the optimal tax rates documented in the literature differ, not 
only across different countries, but also for the same country as can be witnessed in the study 
of Van Heerden and Schoeman (2008) in comparison to that of Saibu (2015) for the case of 
South Africa. Nevertheless, this particular sub-group of studies remains relevant to literature 
seeing that they can be used to guide policymakers in amending discrepancies between the 
current or prevailing tax-growth ratio and the estimated optimal tax-growth rate. 
 
And even with the progressive nature of these studies in capturing the optimal level of 
tax, the underlying empirical model has been further deemed as being flawed on account of 
using a functional form which produces spurious estimates of the optimal level of tax (Hill, 
2008 and Kennedy, 2000). This flaw lead to the emergence to the second sub-group of 
nonlinear studies who empirically capture nonlinearity in the tax-growth relationship by 
employing two measures of government tax in their growth equations, namely the ratio of tax 
returns to GDP as well as the square of tax returns expressed as ratio of GDP. The former term 
is intended to measure the tax-growth relationship at low tax levels whereas the later term 
measures this relationship at high tax levels. Studies which have used to this method to quantify 
nonlinearities in the tax-growth relationship include Dackehag and Hansson (2012), Stoilova 
and Patonov (2013), Nantob (2014), and Hunady and Orvislea (2015). On one hand, the studies 
of Dackehag and Hansson (2012) and Nantob (2014) show that low levels of tax are positively 
correlated with economic growth whilst high levels of tax exert negative effects on growth. On 
the other hand, the study of Stoilova and Patonov (2013) find that low tax rates hamper 
economic growth whereas high levels of taxation are beneficial towards growth. Once again, 
the inconclusiveness of the empirical studies is demonstrated and thus warrants further 
deliberation into the subject. 
 
3 Empirical Framework 
 
Of recent, a growing number of sophisticated nonlinear econometric models have been 
introduced into the academic literature. Among these models, is the smooth transition 
regression (STR) model as introduced by Luukkonen et. al. (1988) and modified by Terasvirata 
(1994). In comparison to other competing state-dependent non-linear time series models such 
as the threshold autoregressive (TAR), Exponential Autoregressive (EAR) and the Markov 
Switching (MS) models, the STR model holds a high level of appeal because unlike these other 
nonlinear models the transition between regime states is endogenously determined. 
Furthermore, the STR encompasses these other nonlinear econometric models. In its baseline 
form, the STR model can be formulated as follows:    
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0
′ 𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽1
′𝑥𝑡 𝐺(𝑧𝑡;  𝜆, 𝑐) +  𝜀𝑡   t ~ iid N(0, h
2
t)   (1) 
 
Where yt is a scalar;𝛽0
′  and 𝛽1
′  are parameter vectors; xt represents the vector of 
explanatory variables, c is the transition variable , γ is the threshold estimate and G(zt; γ, c) is 
a transition function which assumes the following logistic function: 
 
𝐺(𝑧𝑡;  𝛾, 𝑐) =
1
1+exp {−γ ∏ (𝑧𝑡−𝑐𝑘)}
𝑘
𝑘=1
        (2) 
 
Where zt is the transition or threshold variable whereas γ and c are the true threshold 
estimate and the transition parameter, respectively. For empirical purposes we restrict the STR 
model to the cases for k=1 (LSTR-1) and k=2 (LSTR-2). In firstly testing for linearity in 
equation (1), we impose the constraint H0’: β1 = 0 on the regression. However, since the LSTR 
model contains unidentified nuisance parameters under the null hypothesis of linearity, 
conventional tests will produce nonstandard distributions (Davies, 1977). As suggested by 
Luukkonen et. al. (1998), one method of circumventing this problem, involves replacing the 
transition function G(zt; γ ,c) by its first order Taylor expansion around γ = 0, which results in 
the following auxiliary function: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛽0
′∗𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽1
′∗𝑥𝑡𝑧𝑡 + 𝛽2
′∗𝑥𝑡𝑧𝑡
2 + 𝛽3
′∗𝑥𝑡𝑧𝑡
3 + 𝜀𝑡
∗     (3) 
 
Where the parameter vectors 𝛽1
∗, 𝛽2
∗, 𝛽3
∗ are multiples of γ and 𝜀𝑡
∗=𝜀𝑡 + 𝑅3𝛽1
′𝑥𝑡, with R3 
being the remnant portion of the Taylor expansion. Hereafter, the null hypothesis of linearity 
is tested as H0: β1 = β2 = β3 = 0 and this may tested via an LM test such that the Taylor series 
does not affect asymptotic distribution theory. Once the null hypothesis of linearity is rejected, 
one must decide on whether to fit an LSTR-1 or LSTR-2 model to the data. Terasvirta (1994) 
suggests using a decision rule based upon a sequence of tests in equation (3). Particularly, the 
author proposes testing the following null hypotheses: 
 
I. 𝐻04
∗ : 𝛽3
∗ = 0 
II. 𝐻03
∗ : 𝛽2
∗ = 0|𝛽3
∗ = 0 
III. 𝐻02
∗ : 𝛽1
∗ = 0|𝛽3
∗ = 𝛽2
∗ = 0.  
 
The decision rule for selecting either a LSTR-1 or LSTR-2 model is thus as follows. 
Select a LSTR-2 specification if 𝐻02
∗  has the strongest rejection, otherwise, we select the LSTR-
1 specification. Once an appropriate LSTR specification has been chosen, the next step in the 
modelling process is to obtain initial values for estimation purposes and these are obtained by 
performing a grid search with a log-linear grid in γ and a linear grid in c. The starting values 
are those which minimize the residual sum of squares (RSS) over the grid search and thereafter 
the STR parameters are estimated by a nonlinear optimization routine that maximizes the log-
likelihood. 
 
In turning to our theoretical model, we follow in pursuit of De Wet et. al. (2005) who 
present an augmentation of Feder’s (1983) two-sector production function model for empirical 
purposes. In particular, the authors exploit the possibility of government sector impacting 
economic growth through two channels namely; through revenue collections and through 
efficient allocation of resources.  Their empirical growth model is specified as: 
 
?̇?
𝑌⁄ = 𝜃1[
𝐼
𝑌⁄ ] + 𝜃2[
?̇?
𝐿⁄ ] + 𝜃3 [
?̇?𝑑
𝑇
⁄ ] + 𝜃4 [
?̇?𝑖𝑑
𝑇
⁄ ] + [(𝛿 1 + 𝛿⁄ ) − 𝜃3] [
?̇?𝑑
𝑌
⁄ ] +
[(𝛿 1 + 𝛿⁄ ) − 𝜃4] [
?̇?𝑖𝑑
𝑌
⁄ ] + 𝜀𝑡        (4) 
 
Where: 
?̇?
𝑌⁄  measures output growth (GDP). 
𝐼
𝑌⁄  measures the ratio of fixed capital formation to GDP. 
?̇?
𝐿⁄  measures the growth in the labour force. 
?̇?𝑑
𝑇
⁄  measures the growth in direct tax as a ratio of total taxes. 
?̇?𝑖𝑑
𝑇
⁄  measures the growth rate in indirect tax as a ratio of total taxes. 
?̇?𝑑
𝑌
⁄  measures the growth of direct taxes as a share of total income.  
?̇?𝑖𝑑
𝑌
⁄  measures the growth of indirect taxes as a share of total income.  
 
The coefficients 𝜃1, 𝜃2, 𝜃3 and 𝜃4, measure the effects of investment on economic 
growth, labour on economic growth, direct taxes on economic growth and indirect taxes on 
economic growth, respectively. On the other hand, the coefficients [(𝛿 1 + 𝛿⁄ ) − 𝜃3] and 
[(𝛿 1 + 𝛿⁄ ) − 𝜃4], are efficiency measures between direct taxes and the real economy as well 
between indirect taxes and the real economy. If either [(𝛿 1 + 𝛿⁄ ) − 𝜃3] > 0 or 
[(𝛿 1 + 𝛿⁄ ) − 𝜃4] > 0 occurs, then resources collected by the public sector are used more 
efficiently by the government than the resources in the rest of the real sector (De Wet et. al., 
2005). The opposite is only possible if the coefficients 𝜃3 and 𝜃4 are of a greater absolute value 
than the coefficients [(𝛿 1 + 𝛿⁄ ) − 𝜃3] and [(
𝛿
1 + 𝛿⁄ ) − 𝜃4]. In referring back to equations 
(1) through (4), we can transform the linear growth regression (4) into the following STR 
estimation model: 
 
?̇?
𝑌⁄ = 𝜃1[
𝐼
𝑌⁄ ] + 𝜃2[
?̇?
𝐿⁄ ] + 𝜃3 [
?̇?𝑑
𝑇
⁄ ] + 𝜃4 [
?̇?𝑖𝑑
𝑇
⁄ ] + [(𝛿 1 + 𝛿⁄ ) − 𝜃3] [
?̇?𝑑
𝑌
⁄ ] +
[(𝛿 1 + 𝛿⁄ ) − 𝜃4] [
?̇?𝑖𝑑
𝑌
⁄ ] +  
𝜃1
′ [𝐼 𝑌⁄ ] + 𝜃2
′ [?̇? 𝐿⁄ ] + 𝜃3
′ [
?̇?𝑑
𝑇
⁄ ] + 𝜃4
′ [
?̇?𝑖𝑑
𝑇
⁄ ] + [(𝛿
′
1 + 𝛿′⁄ ) − 𝜃3
′ ] [
?̇?𝑑
𝑌
⁄ ] + [(𝛿
′
1 + 𝛿′⁄ ) −
𝜃4
′ ] [
?̇?𝑖𝑑
𝑌
⁄ ] × 𝐺(𝑧𝑡;  𝜆, 𝑐) +𝜀𝑡         (5)
   
Having formulated our estimation model, we thus outline the modelling and estimation 
process of the formulated STR regression as follows. Firstly, we test linearity against the LSTR 
alternative by using each of the explanatory variables as a possible transition variable. Once 
linearity is rejected, we use the decision criteria to choose between LSTR-1 and LSTR-2 
specification and choose the model with the highest rejection. Secondly, we carry out a three-
dimensional grid search over the values of zt, y and c for the STR regression. The optimal 
values are the ones which minimize the residual sum of squares (RSS). Thirdly, we estimate 
the chosen model using a Newton-Raphson algorithm to maximize the conditional maximum 
likelihood function. Lastly, we perform diagnostic tests (i.e. ARCH effects, tests of no error 
autocorrelation and parameter consistency) on the estimated model. 
 
4 Data and Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1 Data and unit root tests 
 
For empirical purposes, we collect all our data from the South African Reserve Bank 
(SARB) online database. Table 1 summarizes the raw time series as has been collected from 
the SARB database. Each of the time series has been collected on quarterly basis between the 
period of 1990:Q1 to 2015:Q2, that is with the exception of taxes on goods and services (VAT) 
and the taxes on income, profits and capital gains, which have been collected on a monthly 
basis from 1990:M1 to 2015:M6. Given the non-uniformity of the time series, we use cubic 
spline interpolation to convert the monthly data (i.e. taxes on goods and services (VAT) and 
the taxes on income, profits and capital gains) into quarterly data over the same sample period.  
  
Table 1: Summary of time series 
SARB code description of time series 
KBP6006S Percentage change in gross domestic 
product (?̇? 𝑌⁄ ) 
 
KBP6282L Percentage change in ratio of gross fixed 
capital formation to GDP (𝐼 𝑌⁄ ) 
 
KBP7008L Total employment in private sector (L) 
 
KBP459M Total net national government tax revenue 
(T) 
 KBP4578M National government tax revenue: taxes on 
goods and services – value added tax (Tid). 
 
KBP4578M National government tax revenue: total 
taxes on income, profits and capital gains 
(Td). 
 
KBP6006L Gross domestic product (millions) (Y) 
Source: SARB online data base (https://www.resbank.co.za/Research/Statistics/Pages/OnlineDownloadFacility.aspx)  
 
As a first step in our empirical analysis, we need to examine the time series variables 
for their integration properties. Given that the time series covers periods which are prone to 
structural breaks, it is advisable to test for unit roots using methods which account for structural 
breaks. Therefore, conventional unit root tests such as the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) 
and Phillips and Perron (PP) tests are inappropriate for the study. We thus consider using the 
unit root tests of Zivot and Andrews (1992) with a structural break existing under the alternative 
hypothesis of a stationary time series process. The unit root tests are performed with i) an 
intercept and ii) with a trend and the optimal lag length of the tests is determined by the 
minimization of the AIC. The results of the unit roots are provided in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit root test  
time series t-statistic breakpoint (year) 
 intercept trend both intercept trend both 
?̇?
𝑌⁄  
-5.45*** -4.85* -5.53*** 1990 1995 1990 
𝐼
𝑌⁄  
 
-8.19*** -7.24*** -8.52*** 1994 1995 1994 
?̇?
𝐿⁄  
-5.89*** -2.11 -7.06*** 1994 1992 1994 
?̇?𝑑
𝑇
⁄  
-5.59*** -7.60*** -7.57*** 1995 1994 1994 
?̇?𝑖𝑑
𝑇
⁄  
-11.74*** -11.40*** -11.80*** 1991 1992 1991 
?̇?𝑑
𝑌
⁄  
-10.74*** -10.85*** -10.79*** 1998 1998 1998 
?̇?𝑖𝑑
𝑌
⁄  
11.61*** -11.61*** -11.37*** 1998 1998 1998 
Significance levels are given as follows: ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent the 1 percent, 5percent and 10 percent significance levels respectively. 
The test statistics for first differences are reported in parentheses. The critical values for the Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit root tests inclusive 
of an intercept only are as follows: 1 percent: -5.34, 5 percent:-4.80 and 1 percent: -4.58; the critical values for the unit root test inclusive of a 
trend are as follows: 1 percent: -4.93, 5 percent: -4.42 and 1 percent: -4.11 whereas the critical values for the unit root test inclusive of a trend 
are as follows: 1 percent: -5.57, 5 percent: -5.08 and 1 percent: -4.82. 
 
Based on the unit root test results reported in Table 2, all observed time series, in their 
levels, reject the null hypothesis of a unit root regardless of whether the unit root test regression 
includes an intercept, a trend or both. An exception is warranted for the unit root tests 
performed with trend on the growth in labour force variable. However, this is merely an 
exceptional result than the norm. Another thing worth noting form the unit root test results 
reported in Table 2 is that the various structural break points detected in the time series 
correspond to the political shift of South Africa towards a democratic economy as witnessed 
in 1994. Notably, the tax recommendations of the Katz commission where introduced and 
implemented during the period of 1994 to 1998 which saw significant changes in the personal 
income tax system. The detected structural breaks correspond to this period of tax reforms 
within the country. All-in-all, we conclude that all utilized time series appear to be stationary 
in their levels (i.e. integrated of order I(0)) and this satisfies a preliminary condition for 
estimating the STR model without the fear of obtaining spurious regression results.  
 
4.2 Selection, estimation and evaluation of STR model 
 
Prior to the estimation of the STR model, we need to conduct linearity tests in order to 
determine an appropriate transition variable for estimation usage. The purpose of the suggested 
linearity tests is two-fold. Firstly, we use the linearity tests to inform us on which candidate 
transition variable is most suitable for modelling nonlinear behaviour among the time series. 
Secondly, we use the p-values from the linearity tests to determine whether the selected 
transition variable should be used to model the STR regression as either an LSTR-1 or LSTR-
2 model. Pragmatically, we carry out the linearity tests by conducting a sequence of F-tests and 
compute their corresponding p-values. The decision rule is to choose the model which produces 
the lowest p-values. For the chosen model, we also conduct supplementary tests for no 
remaining nonlinearity. The results of the linearity tests are reported in Table 3 whereas the 
results of the tests for no remaining nonlinearity are presented in Table 4. 
 
The linearity test results reported in Table 3 reveal that the null hypothesis of linearity 
can be rejected for only two candidate variables, those being, the growth of direct taxes as a 
share of total income (
?̇?𝑑
𝑌
⁄ ) and the growth of indirect taxes as a share of total income (
?̇?𝑖𝑑
𝑌
⁄ ). 
However, given smaller p-values associated with the growth of indirect taxes as a share of total 
income (
?̇?𝑖𝑑
𝑌
⁄ ), we consider this time series the most suitable transition variable for building 
our LSTR model. Also given that the F3 statistic produces the highest rejection associated with 
the (
?̇?𝑖𝑑
𝑌
⁄ ) variable, we decide upon fitting an LSTR-1 to the data. Furthermore, the results of 
the tests of no remaining linearity, as performed on the chosen LSTR-1 model and reported in 
Table 4, shows no evidence of remaining nonlinearity for the regression model.  
 
Table 3: Linearity tests 
transition 
variable 
tests statistics Decision 
 F F4 F3 F2  
𝐼
𝑌⁄  
4.3438e-01 1.5583e-01       6.8692e-01 5.6340e-01 Linear 
?̇?
𝐿⁄  
3.6582e-01    2.8636e-01    2.4223e-01    6.7763e-01 Linear 
?̇?𝑑
𝑇
⁄  
1.8651e-01    7.4984e-01    2.3839e-01    5.8844e-02 Linear 
?̇?𝑖𝑑
𝑇
⁄  
2.9371e-01    8.2546e-01    6.7247e-01    2.6595e-02 Linear 
?̇?𝑑
𝑌
⁄  
2.7808e-03    4.0006e-03    5.7885e-02    3.0139e-01 LSTR(1) 
?̇?𝑖𝑑
𝑌
⁄  
1.4412e-02    3.2655e-02    6.2697e-01    1.6723e-02 LSTR(1)# 
Note: The F-tests for nonlinearity are performed for each possible candidate of the transition variable and the variable with the strongest test rejection (i.e. the smallest p-value) 
is tagged with symbol #.  
 
Table 4: Tests of no remaining nonlinearity 
F-statistics p-value 
F 1.0809e-01 
F4 1.6560e-01 
F3 6.1657e-02 
F2 6.5915e-01 
 
Having conducted our linearity tests as well as the tests of no remaining nonlinearity, 
we proceed to estimate the LSTR-1 model with the growth of indirect taxes as a share of total 
income (
?̇?𝑖𝑑
𝑌
⁄ ) being the transition variable. The parameter estimates of the selected LSTR-1 
model are reported in Table 5.  We note that the threshold value of the transition variable is 
estimated to be 0.1027, which implies that the regimes are dependent upon whether 
?̇?𝑖𝑑
𝑌
⁄  < 
0.1027 (i.e. lower regime) or 
?̇?𝑖𝑑
𝑌
⁄  ≥ 0.1027 (i.e. upper regime). The relatively high transition 
parameter estimate of 10.00 indicates a rather abrupt change in moving from one regime state 
to another. In the lower regime of the STR model, we find that direct taxes have a significantly 
negative impact on economic growth whereas indirect taxes exert a significantly positive effect 
on growth. One can note that these results are an improvement over those presented in de Wet 
et. al. (2005) who find a similar result of a negative effect of direct taxes on economic growth 
and yet find an insignificant effect of indirect taxes on economic growth. Thus, by effect, our 
estimation results support the notion that government revenue collections could be improved, 
by shifting reliance from direct to indirect taxes.  
 
Furthermore, in the lower regime of the model, the coefficients on the relative 
efficiency variables, 
?̇?𝑑
𝑌
⁄  and 
?̇?𝑖𝑑
𝑌
⁄ , are significant with the coefficient on the 
?̇?𝑑
𝑌
⁄  variable 
being positive, thus implying that resources collected by the public sector can be used more 
efficient by the government than resources collected in the rest of the real sector. Once again, 
this result is an improvement over that reported in de Wet et. al. (2005), who find no efficiency 
effects associated with public revenue collection. Another finding worth pointing out concerns 
the growth in the labour force (?̇? 𝐿⁄ ), of which under the lower regime produces a statistically 
significant and positive coefficient which turns negative and insignificant in the upper regime 
of the model. Notably, Phiri (2014) finds a similar finding of regime switching behaviour 
between employment and economic growth for South African data. 
  
Also note that the coefficient on the investment variable produces a significantly 
negative estimate in the lower regime and remains negative and yet insignificant in the upper 
regime of the model. This negative coefficient on the investment variable contradicts 
conventional growth theory and yet for the case of South Africa is a plausible result for the 
following two reasons. Firstly, a greater part of South Africa’s investments are not ‘Greenfield 
investments’ which would contribute to infrastructure development and job creation but are 
rather mergers and acquisitions (Fortainer, 2007). The second reason is that the current high 
levels of public spending and budget deficits crowd out the positive effects of investment in 
the South African economy (Biza et. al., 2015).  
 
In observing the coefficient estimates found in the upper regime of the model, we notice 
that the impact of all these growth explanatory variables become insignificant. By default, this 
implies that the lower regime of the estimated LSTR-1 model is most efficient and that 
policymakers should strive to keep the economy in such a state, that is, to keep the growth of 
indirect taxes as a share of total income (
?̇?𝑖𝑑
𝑌
⁄ ) below 10.27 percent. The diagnostics tests 
performed on the estimated LSTR-1 model show that the regression residuals are well-behaved. 
In particular, evidence is provided for no autocorrelation, for no ARCH effects and also 
sufficient evidence for normality of the regression residuals.  
 
Table 5: STR regression estimates 
 linear part nonlinear part 
𝐼
𝑌⁄  
 
-0.83098 
(0.00)*** 
-0.07133 
(0.87) 
?̇?
𝐿⁄  
0.07449 
(0.00)*** 
-0.01991 
(0.62) 
?̇?𝑑
𝑇
⁄  
-0.56565 
(0.00)*** 
0.27585 
(0.62) 
?̇?𝑖𝑑
𝑇
⁄  
0.38683 
(0.00)*** 
-0.03800 
(0.96) 
?̇?𝑑
𝑌
⁄  
0.54695 
(0.00)*** 
-0.24632 
(0.59) 
?̇?𝑖𝑑
𝑌
⁄  
-0.46797 
(0.00)*** 
0.27639 
(0.63) 
c 10.00 
(0.02)** 
λ 0.1027 
(0.00)*** 
 
Diagnostic tests on residuals 
 
LM(4) 6.70 
(0.00)*** 
ARCH(4) 11.20 
(0.03) 
J-B 0.92 
(0.63) 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are given as follows: ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent the 1 percent, 5percent and 10 percent significance levels 
respectively. LM and ARCH respectively denote the Lagrange Multiplier and Ljung-Box statistics for autocorrelation whilst the J-B denotes the Jarque-Bera normality test of 
the regression residuals.  
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
With discussions of tax reforms being high on the agenda of fiscal authorities in South 
Africa, the main objective of this paper was to investigate the growth trade-off effects between 
direct and indirect taxes in the country using interpolated quarterly time series data collected 
from 1990:q1 to 2015:q2. While the necessity to account for nonlinearities in the estimation 
process has long been advocated for, we are unaware of any previous studies which have done 
so for the case of South Africa. Therefore, in differing from previous studies conducted for 
South Africa, we test for nonlinearities in the taxation-growth relationship by using the recently 
developed LSTR model. The theoretical framework for our case study is adopted from de Wet 
et. al (2005) who develop an augmented empirical model based on the Feder’s (1983) two-
sector production function model. The application the LSTR estimators to the theoretical model 
is favourable in producing a more theoretical appealing results in comparison to estimates that 
could have been obtained from other nonlinear econometric models. This is because the 
transition between the model regimes in the STR model is conducted in a smooth manner and 
the rate of adjustment between both regimes can be measured. Moreover, the variable 
responsible for the regime switching behaviour in the LSTR model is determined intrinsically 
as part of the estimation process.   
 
Indeed, our empirical results confirm the existence of a nonlinear growth trade-off 
effects with direct and indirect taxes for the data, with indirect taxes accounting for the regime 
switching behaviour in the estimated model. Interestingly enough, our results show that both 
direct and indirect taxes are only significantly related with economic growth when the indirect 
tax-growth ratio is below a threshold of 10.24 percent. Below this threshold, we observe that 
indirect taxes are positively related with economic growth whilst direct taxes adversely affect 
growth. Moreover, it is within this lower regime that we find resources collected by 
government can be efficiently used and that the labour growth variable has a positive effect on 
economic growth. By policy implication this presents a case for fiscal authorities to exploit the 
nonlinear tax-growth relationship to their advantage by specifically exploiting the positive 
relationship found between indirect taxes and economic growth below the established 
threshold. This, in turn, would entail a gradual shift of reliance in collecting government 
revenue from direct taxes to indirect taxes. And yet is should be cautioned that policymakers 
should take care to not breach the threshold level and avoid moving the economy into regions 
beyond the threshold point. Research similar to ours could also be extended to other Sub-
Saharan African (SSA) countries in view of limited empirical evidence for these countries. 
This would an ideal for future research seeing that African countries tend to be more reliant on 
government revenues for social and economic welfare. 
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